Presidency of Salvador Allende: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
No edit summary
Rescuing 3 sources and tagging 0 as dead. #IABot (v1.6.1) (Balon Greyjoy)
Line 28:
Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum of six years in office, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. He had a significant restructuring program organized.
 
At the beginning, there was broad support in Congress to expand the government's already large part of the economy, as the Popular Unity and Christian Democrats together had a clear majority. But the government's efforts to pursue these policies led to strong opposition by landowners, some middle-class sectors, the rightist [[National Party (Chile) (1966-1973)|National Party]], financiers, and the [[Roman Catholic Church]] (which in 1973 was displeased with the direction of the educational policy<ref name="Mabry" /><ref>[http://www.iglesia.cl/iglesiachile/2003/1973/aplenenu.html CECH - Conferencia Episcopal de Chile [www.iglesiachile.org&#93;] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060216175158/http://www.iglesia.cl/iglesiachile/2003/1973/aplenenu.html |date=16 February 2006 }}</ref>). Eventually the Christian Democrats united with the National Party in Congress.
 
The Popular Unity coalition itself was far from unanimous. Allende himself was committed to democracy and represented a more moderate faction of his Socialist Party. He was supported by the Communist Party, that—despite being ultimately less committed to representative democracy—favoured a cautious, gradual approach. For example, the Communists urged to find a compromise with the Christian Democrats and supported the application of reforms through Congress. In contrast, the radical leftist wing of the Socialist Party wanted to smash the capitalist system at once, even if that meant violent actions.<ref name=youssef>{{cite book|last=Cohen|first=Youssef|title=Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America|year=1994|publisher=University of Chicago Press|location=Chicago, IL|isbn=9780226112718|pages=98–118|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lTTTBv4UJ_kC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref> If one includes smaller parties, Allende's moderate left-wing line was supported by moderate [[Socialist Party of Chile|Socialists]], [[Communist Party of Chile|Communists]], [[Radical Party (Chile)|Radicals]] (Social Democrats merged with that party in June 1972) and part of the [[MAPU]] (later: [[MAPU Obrero Campesino|MAPU/OC]]), whereas the left-wing Socialists (led by Altamirano), the extremist elements of the MAPU, of the [[Christian Left (Chile)|Christian Left]] and the [[Revolutionary Left Movement (Chile)|MIR]] (not belonging to the Unidad Popular) represented the far-left.
Line 67:
Allegations have been made in a book by [[Christopher Andrew (historian)|Christopher Andrew]], based on the handwritten notes of alleged KGB archivist [[Vasili Mitrokhin]] that Allende was connected to the KGB.<ref>''[[The Times]]'' extract from the [[Mitrokhin Archive]] volume II, by Mitrokhin and historian [[Christopher Andrew (historian)|Christopher Andrew]][http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1786802_1,00.html]</ref> However, these allegations are not accurate because the KGB was not allowed to recruit members from communist or other left wing parties in Latin America, because the Soviet Union thought that doing so had the potential to damage the Communist doctrine or other left wing brother parties. In addition, the Soviet Union did not consider Latin American countries as enemies, so their intelligence was not targeted towards Latin America but towards the United States.<ref name=Leonov/>
 
Declarations from KGB General [[Nikolai Leonov]], former Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate of the State Security Committee of the KGB, state that the Soviet Union supported Allende's government economically, politically and militarily.<ref name=Leonov>[[Nikolai Leonov]], "[http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_2/doc_1140.html Soviet Intelligence in Latin America During the Cold War] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100228185053/http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_2/doc_1140.html |date=28 February 2010 }}", Lectures by General Nikolai Leonov, Centro de Estudios Publicos (Chile), 22 September 1999.</ref> Leonov stated in an interview at the Chilean Center of Public Studies (CEP) that the Soviet economic support included over $100 million in credit, three fishing ships (that distributed 17,000 tons of frozen fish to the population), factories (as help after the 1971 earthquake), 3,100 tractors, 74,000 tons of wheat, and more than a million tins of [[condensed milk]].<ref name="Leonov"/>
 
In mid-1973, the USSR had approved the delivery of weapons (artillery, tanks) to the Chilean Army. However, when news of an attempt from the Army to depose Allende through a coup d'état reached Soviet officials, the shipment was redirected to another country.<ref name="Leonov"/>
Line 127:
==External links==
* [http://www.salvador-allende.cl/Cronologia/cronologia.htm An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era.] This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070831070131/http://www.josepinera.com/pag/pag_tex_quiebredemoc_en.htm The 22 August 1973 document] under which the Chamber of Deputies opposed the Allende regime. This is a solid translation of the document, although the introductory note is clearly that of an apologist for the coup.
* {{es icon}} [http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Manifiesto_al_pa%C3%ADs_de_Salvador_Allende,_respondiendo_al_acuerdo_de_la_camara_de_diputados Allende's 24 August 1973 response]
* [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/latin_america/chile.htm National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project] which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet