Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 8

Someone requested a citation directly after my add "By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z". I removed request b/c it's already provided at the end of the sentence (after the colon & quote). Also, a google search on "Operation Z Pearl Harbor" will get lots of hits confirming the Japanese name for the Pearl Harbor plans. Hope this clears it up. P. Moore 02:56, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

I'd be very disinclined to rely on the number of Google hits. The only source I know of calling it "Operation Z" is Toland, who isn't exactly at the top of my list of reliable sources, either. And Japanese sources list it differently, which is why I put the tag in. Trekphiler 19:05, 21 June 2007 (UTC) (BTW, I've heard the Togo bit before. My guess is, in planning it was OpZ, but when executed, it became OpAE, per MO & MI, standard IJN codename practise. 19:12, 21 June 2007 (UTC))

Some of the google hits seem reputable, including one from a university in California, another from an author named Carl Smith (Pearl Harbor: Day of Infamy). So let's assume their original source is Toland, why don't I add "According to one source..." in front of the sentence and restore the citation, instead of leaving it in perpetual "citation required"? Zatoichi26 02:27, 5 September 2007 (UTC)

I'd rather it not be 1 source either way or we get a tossup who to believe. Have you seen Smith's book? (I haven't.) And I know the IJN practise was to use initial letters, even if some disbelieve the accuracy of Prange (who says same in Papers), so "Z" is contrary to established practise, regardless what Toland (or Smith) says, & that has to be answered. "One source says" doesn't get it. Trekphiler 11:26, 5 September 2007 (UTC)

How's this: can somebody date the adoption of "Z"? Or AI? That way, we get "known as 'Z' [date], later changed to 'AI'<ref>''Papers''</ref>". Trekphiler 03:48, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

No, I've not seen the Smith, book, just an excerpt on the Internet. According to Toland it became "Op Z" in Apr 1941 (as the article currently says). Not sure how to resolve this then... you seem to be better read on the subject than me, if you question it based on other sources & want to remove it altogether I won't oppose. Zatoichi26 18:24, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

I'm not inclined to remove it, just hoping to resolve the conflict (& I should read more carefully...). The April date suggests a planning ID, in the fashion of "Plan Orange" or "Fall Gelb". I don't have Toland handy; from what he says, can we say, "In planning, known as 'Z' from April '41; on approval, [date], it became 'AI'<ref>''Papers''</ref>"? Trekphiler 03:40, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Sounds good to me, if someone can find that additional information... my reading habits tend to jump around; I'm currently "off" reading about WWII.. :) Zatoichi26 00:56, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

there is a mistake in the page "royers beyond repair, and destroyed and 188 aircraf" but I can't edit it.. someone else please. this stupid lockdown stops honest editors. don't do it —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.86.253.202 (talk) 03:16, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

I rewrote

"Addition of modern radar to the salavaged vessels would increase the offensive capablilities of even the slower battleships well beyond those more primative radar-equiped ships of the IJN, and the "slow" battleships (pre Iowa class)"

because IJN ships weren't "primitive", & the slow BBs having radar was irrelevant in comparison to them, since they weren't going to engage in gun duels to begin with (which was the point: they were too slow...). I also rewrote

"capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to its Pacific Fleet for a year or so."

because it wasn't damage to the fleet as much as damage to its offensive capacity, given no carriers were transferred from the Atlantic. And this really isn't the place to discuss the implications on the SWPA of basing in San Pedro, or the Q of pulling subs back to Hawaii (rather than Oz). Maybe Pacific War... (Or message my talk page, & I'll explain.) Trekphiler 20:50, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

A couple of points:I think the "primitive" modifies radar, not IJN battleships. The Japanese fire control radar was below average for the day. Looking at the later Leyte Gulf (specifically Surigao Strait) three BBs from Pearl (Tennesee & California - both launched in 1919 & the West Virginia - launched 1921) used their superior fire control radar to pound the IJN Yamashiro (launched 1915) before she could ever draw a line on the USN BBs. Older battleships still had a place in the USN. —Preceding unsigned comment added by ScottMo (talk • contribs) 14:01, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

Agree, that was probably the intent, but it's not how it reads. And by Surigao Strait, the U.S. controlled the sea, so Tennessee et al. having better gunlaying radar is irrelevant. Trekphiler (talk) 21:12, 18 November 2007 (UTC) (BTW, I did know Japanese radar quality was excerable.)

I put in the original ref to ORANGE; as it now stands, I'd say take it out. Absent any ref to Japanese plans, it feels a bit odd. Comment? Trekphiler 00:10, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

Agree on taking it out. The article still needs trimming by 20% and there is way too much extraneous detail. Parts of the article read like a novel instead of an encyclopedia article. BTW, good job on the edits. --Paul 00:39, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

Thanks. Been reading in this area for years, so it's good to be able to put it to use. Trekphiler 21:45, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

There's a ref in the article to how the Japanese planners were influence by the Battle of Tsushima. i don't really see the relevance of this engagement which happened two eras of naval warfare previously; is it simply that the IJN was influenced by Tsushima in the way that the Royal Navy is influenced by Trafalgar? The Land 22:25, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

It has to do with doctrine, defeating the opposing fleet in "decisive battle", & with how it (seemingly) broke the enemy will to fight. It's also an example of IJN's (Japanese military generally) bad grasp of history & the difference between strategy & tactics. Trekphiler 23:04, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

There is also a strain of emulation of historic surprise attacks, as against the Russians, in the planning for Pearl Harbor. The attention paid to declarations of war (little and late in any case), to ensuring that all of the 14 part note reach Washington prior to hostilities (not enough to light a real fire under the Embassy folks in Washington, or to delay destruction of Purple machines there, ...), etc. Hard to source, but even in IJN there was a strain of something resembling samurai ethic; lots in the Army. In my view there was also some confusion between tactical surprise, which would not have earned as much reaction from the West, and strategic surprise, which did. ww 19:25, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

Agreed. Both IJA & IJN had real trouble distinguishing between tactical & strategic generally, for some reason, taking battlefield victory for victory in war; cf the "decisive victory" doctrine, for instance. Trekphiler 15:38, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

the Shaw had its bow blown off, a new bow was later fabricated.CorvetteZ51 07:57, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Have added an article on Henry Clausen and the Clausen Report. Perhaps someone knows when (if) Henry Clausen died, and what the C in Henry C. Clausen stands for? Hugo999 11:29, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

I restored "P-40s were obsolescent (already scheduled for replacement by the P-38)". The fact there were only 25 sorties is irrelevant to the obsolescence of the P-40. And it stayed in service because there was nothing else. Production of P-38, -47, & (ultimately) -51 was committed. Had the Army not wrecked the prototype P-38, it would have been in standard service by December 1941, the P-40s would have been dumped off on (for instance) the Dutch East Indies, & the P-36s would have been junked. Do me a favor, don't revert it again. Trekphiler 17:57, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

I added "(in particular, the U.S.)" since IJN's main concern was USN; it does need to be reworded... I have a problem with "Japanese actions included the 1905 war with Russia", since this was a mutual conflict; Russia wanted an icefree port, & Korea offered one (Port Arthur). Also, "more than 80 percent of Japan's oil imports at the time came from the United States", while true, is less relevant than the percentage of Japan's total that was imported. Trekphiler 03:19, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

I deleted

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

becaus it's not relevant to the attack (not directly, anyhow), & the repeated blockquotes from Japanese POV, with no quotes from the U.S. side, leaves me feeling there's a pro-Japanese bias (or at least a mania for the trivial). While I was at it, I also del the blockquote of Nagano's orders to Yamamoto; it can as easily be paraphrased. As a rule, I'd say, unless the quote says something that cannot be paraphrased (or should not be; "day of infamy", say), don't put it in, reword it. Trekphiler 13:34, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

I deleted or rewrote this:

"1st Carrier Division (Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo), 2nd (Vice Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi) and 5th (Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara), escorted by 3rd Battleship Division (Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa), 8th Cruiser Division, and 1st Destroyer Squadron (Vice Admiral Sentaro Omori), screened by Sixth Submarine Fleet (Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu)"

because it's far from clear to me we need every CO's name (put it on the OOB page). Also, can we come to some agreement over use of cardinals or ordinals? It's usual in the sources I've seen to refer to Carrier Division 1 (or CarDiv 1, per USN practise), & traditional to use "Sixth" rather than "6th" for fleets (as senior commands), & I really don't want to get in a revert war over it. Trekphiler 14:46, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Since the Japanese claimed descent from the sun god, & the "8 corners of the world" doctrine implicitly put Japan at the top, saying it gave them a (so-callled) "divine right" is valid. (Notice I don't, in fact, say it was divine at any point...) Trekphiler 21:03, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

Are you going to source it? I'd regard statements about Japanese religious beliefs with scepticism in this article, particularly as they tend to reinforce the American POV which we are trying to iron out. Regards, The Land 21:43, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

A source is really going to be the only way to keep POV out of the way. Jmlk17 21:44, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

In the first place, there's nothing religious about it, any more than there was when Henry VIII made the claim; it was (is) a political assertion of superiority on alleged divine preference. Or do you believe the Crusaders were claiming divine right to kill Muslims for (purely) religious reasons? As for a source, look at Bix' Hirohito (cited), Stephan's Hawaii under the Rising Sun, Peattie & Evans Kaigun (cited), Tsuji's Shonan (tr as Singapore), Edgerton's Warriors of the Rising Sun, Willmott Empires in the Balance (cited), Hunter's Emergence of Modern Japan, Schirokauer's Brief History of Modern Japan, & maybe Toland's Eagle against the Rising Sun, Hoyt's Japan's War, & Tokayer & Swartz's Fugu Plan, too; I don't have any of them in front of me, so I can't quote you a pp#. Don't cry to me about how hard it'll be to find; except for Hunter & Schirokauer (where I only read the relevant parts), I've read them all. (OK, I quit Bix when he reached the end of the war, more or less.) That's what indices are for. Trekphiler 11:23, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

current article text says 'three destroyers destroyed'.my count is two. two destroyed in a drydock. plus, USS Shaw had bow blown off, ? CorvetteZ51 08:18, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Uhm, the USS Shaw (DD-373) was the one with its bow blown off, but was repaired and served in the war. Jmlk17 08:45, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

ugh, two plus zero is two, what am i missing here?, two destroyed in drydock is two, not three CorvetteZ51 11:01, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

To answer your question, I don't know who writes the incorrect numbers. I fixed them and added this ref:CinCPac report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar. Unless otherwsie stated, all vessels listed are salvageable. (Saying a ship sunk, implies it's never going to be used again, and all but two were repaired and fought.) Anynobody 07:00, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

I deleted

", because as they saw it, they were afraid that Japan might challenge their control in Asia"

as POV & incorrect; worry was dominate weak China by aggressive Japan. I deleted

"Japanese actions included the 1905 war and victory over Russia"

as incorrect (the militarist period didn't begin until around 1926, & the RJW was rooted over Japan's fear of a threat from Russia) & rewrote. I also deleted

"Japan was a country with few natural resources and small arable land to support agriculture and human habitation. Its country size was little smaller than the size of California, US of which 73% was made up of mountains and supports around 73 million people around 1941^[1], necessitating the import of vital essentials like oil, metal, and even basic necessities like food as the mountainous archipelago which made up Japan did not have adequate space for the amount of food production necessary to sustain its population and the rapid industrialization. It was in order to satisfy the growth of Japan that it began a slow invasion of China, starting with Manchuria in 1931. The United States opposed the move, and subsequent Japanese aggression met with stricter US embargoes of raw materials to Japan. The final straw was an eventual embargo on exporting oil, a necessity to which it was almost entirely dependent on the US/European powers to provide."

becaused Japan's desire for autarky was not a direct product of the limitations. It was driven, in part, by an inability (or unwillingness) to recognize trade was able to make up the difference, as Britain had been proving for more than a century (despite what Thomas Malthus & the neo-Malthusian green zealots will tell you; he at least had the excuse of ignorance). Trekphiler 10:53, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I deleted the rogue's gallery. (They aren't an "attack crew", to begin with; it wasn't "Ocean's 27".)

• 
  Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (attack commander, 1st Carrier Division)
• 
  Vice Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi (2nd Carrier Division)
• 
  Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara (5th Carrier Division)
• 
  Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa (3rd Battleship Division)
• 
  Vice Admiral Sentaro Omori (1st Destroyer Squadron)
• 
  Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa (3rd Submarine Squadron)
• 
  Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka (Chief of staff, 1st Air Fleet)
• 
  Aircraft carrier Akagi (1st Carrier Division)

It leaves the article with a picture of every major Japanese officer involved, which is more than a little unbalanced. Unless, until, there's a gallery including Short, Kimmel, Bellinger, Rochefort, the PacAF CO, Halsey, Fletcher, Brown, Withers, Gin Steyers, & Al McCann, this should stay out. BTW, offhand I don't recall at sea pix of Big E or Lady Lex, either, so pix of Akagi or Kaga might need to be reconsidered. And if we're including Tojo or Hirohito, no pix of Stark or FDR? I'm not suggesting "equal time", just a little less heavy on the Japanese.

On that note, do we really need the names of every JO involved? As I said, put them on the OOB page, since I don't feature anyone thinking it's a good idea to name McClusky (CAG, Enterprise), Max Leslie (CAG, McCann (ComSubRon 6), Styer (then Withers' Chief of Staff), Freeland Daubin (ComSubRon 42, but also the Sub Base, which does merit a mention; he's not there now, amid the obsession for aviation, per usual), Stony Roper (ComSubDiv 42), Norman Ives (ComSubDiv 43), Shorty Edmunds (ComSubDiv 61), & Forrest O'Leary (ComSubDiv 62), to name a few. It's a common failing of writers who don't really understand the subject to throw every bit of trivia at it, hoping it makes them sould authoritative; sometimes, it's better to take out things & concentrate on what's really important. For instance, besides having a movie made about him, what did Dorie Miller actually accomplish? Downing 1 plane? 2? Unless he got the fist high award for valor presented to a black man of the War, leave him out. Much as it pains me, I'd say, take out Tautog too; she may've gotten the first Japanese plane, but it's small potatoes, considering. I'd be inclinded to trim out refs to Rochefort & the band, while I'm there (tho, in a footnote, they're not quite so ostentatious). Absent strenuous objection, I'll be taking it out in a day or so. Trekphiler 16:31, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Dorie Miller was the first African American awarded a Navy Cross ever. Maralia 17:04, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Propose creation of WP:SS articles

This is a unique situation where the amount of relevant information available is almost overwhelming. It could almost be the poster child for serial style since Trekphiler's points are all valid when looking at the battle overall. Dorie Miller didn't actually effect the outcome in any way, so discussing him in an article about the attack as a whole is out of place. On the other hand Dorie Miller is a highly notable individual participant.

We can actually have it both ways if the strategic implications and outcome are discussed in this article, while individual major ships could be spun off into articles like USS West Virgina (BB-48) during the attack on Pearl Harbor where Miller could be discussed as well as specific damage/casualties/events notable to the ship, and directly related to the attack, but not enough to mention in an overview of it. Anynobody 21:56, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I'm inclined to agree. It's all too easy to find a fascinating factoid or three & put 'em in, without considering the impact on the whole. (I'm guilty, too; I put in the bandsmen at HYPO to begin with, since somebody'd mentioned they were unemployed, for some reason.) As I read the description of events during the attack, it strikes me there's too much detail, as if somebody's trying to describe every bomb-fall, which isn't usual. Given the possibility of "forking out", can that be broken into "events during", or something & summarized here? (I like the individual "BB34 @Pearl" page idea, but it occurs to me, most of these ships, on both sides, already have pages; put the details there? (That also applies to other battles, BTW; the details of Murphy at Midway can be found at Tambor (& if it can't, I'll get to it soon enough...). Stylistically, I'm guided by Britannica: an over-arching article "Attack", with sub-articles "weaps", "leaders" (& where's the US page...?), "OOB" (& where's the US OOB page...?), "incidents", "notable figures" (Miller, Tyler, Lockard, Welsh, Genda, Fuchida, Yoshikawa), as appropriate. No? Trekphiler 22:37, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I don't think additional pages such as USS West Virginia (BB-48) during the attack on Pearl Harbor would generally be beneficial. Dorie Miller is well-covered in his own article and at USS West Virginia (BB-48); in my response above, I was frankly rather incredulous that someone was considering removing information about him from this article without even reading his article to see why it was considered relevant. I would offer, however, that Miller is not the significant factor here—rather, it is the issuance of the first Navy Cross to an African American that is relevant. I would support removing references to him from the main article and instead adding a 'See also' link to Military history of African Americans#World War II, which covers Miller but also attempts to frame the broader issue. Maralia 20:50, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Seems to me the point is to take out the cruft (if it is) here & move it to where it's relevant. I don't argue Miller's earning the Navy Cross is important, but is it relevant to the attack (which is what I meant)? How much did the 1-2 (if that many) a/c he downed amount to? Any more than the 1 Tautog scored, which is not a lot. (Also, just for clarity's sake, I'd double-check Miller's award; blacks have served since the American Revolution, & one Cross in that time seems low to me. Not impossible, just worthy of a check.) I'd say the same for taking out mention of the length of Yoshikawa's hair (!), if somebody hasn't del it already. If we're breaking out people, as I said, I'd put them all on a "notable figs" page, linked to their own pages (if any, & if they're notable during the attack, they deserve 1, which leaves me wondering why nobody's gotten to Bellinger yet...). Trekphiler 22:09, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

my count is zero.Please name (ship) names. CorvetteZ51 13:10, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

The USS Cassin (DD-372) and the USS Downes (DD-375), where the two american destroyers "lost" during the attack. At the time both were considered to be a total loss, and both were decommissioned from the US Navy. It is true that both required extensive repairs to the point where both must have been essentially rebuilt, because it took each destroyer about 2 years before they were recommissioned. This timeframe I think is significant because 2 years is approximately the time it took from when these ships are first laid down until they were ready for service, and that was before the "american war machine" was in full swing. -- malo (tlk) (cntrbtns) 13:58, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

"both required extensive repairs"? Not really. Their machinery was salvaged & installed in new hulls; only the names were retained. Lenton rates that "salved". Me? I'd call that "lost"... Trekphiler 20:29, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

I had read (probably from the ebook sold at asawa.org, or maybe it was in my Funk & Wagnall's encyclopedia) that Japan's plans to invade the Philippines were the reason why they pre-emptively attacked Pearl Harbor. They knew that our Pacific Fleet would retaliate if they attacked the Philippines. Captain Zyrain 04:22, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

True, & they were both terrible decisions. Most of what Japan achieved in DEI was accomplished before the Philippines fell, conquest of which was intended to protect the DEI op; attack the Philippines, hence Pearl Harbor, brings in the U.S., whence ruin. Trekphiler 10:23, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

This article is pretty large, so in the interest of WP:SIZE and WP:SS I moved almost everything prior to the attack into its own page. Anynobody 05:26, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

That certainly shortens the main article. I've fixed up the new artilce with categories, a reflist, etc. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 19:16, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

D'oh! I knew I forgot something, thanks for taking care of those. Anynobody 22:58, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

Damage to capital ships

This may be more appropriate in another spin off, but I was hoping to discuss the damage/action on each BB. For example a section describing what happened on the West Virgina, would include discussion about Dorrie Miller, and damage to the ship: Anynobody 22:58, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

If we have articles on the ships then we should probably include the detailed damage reports there. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 23:10, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

We do, but some of them are especially large too (For example Tennessee has it's own spin off for 1941-43:USS Tennessee (BB-43) 1941-1943). I was thinking along the lines of a sort of unified spin off from this article and really detailed articles about the battleships themselves into an article called something like: Capital ships during the Pearl Harbor attack. Anynobody 02:09, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

Ditto Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor

I noticed that there was almost as much discussion about the aftermath as their was about the lead up. Since I was already making a {{Pearl Harbor attack}} template I figured I'd follow the logical step of creating an article about the results. This way, here we can just discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor. Anynobody 01:24, 28 October 2007 (UTC)

New Explanation (after Kuweit and Iraq and BEFORE Iran)

What about the possibility, that japan waged a pre-emptive strike on pearl harbour because the usa did threaten them with an economic war (steel- and oil-embargo) and because the usa indeed were developing "weapons of mass destruction" which only 44 month later would kill 220.000 innocent civilians in hiroshima and nagasaki. could that not be true? or perhaps japan wanted to 'liberate' the philippines from their american oppressors??? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Scyriacus (talk • contribs) 11:55, 1 November 2007 (UTC)

• The WMD argument doesn't fly because the U.S. only built them in response to the Germans possibly getting it first. Economic war against Japan was perfectly justified because of what they were doing in China. Yes, you could say that Japan wanted to "liberate" Asia from European influence, and this was one argument they used for supporting the war. However, in many cases the Japanese turned out to be far more brutal oppressors than the European colonialists. It's also worth mentioning that the U.S. eventually granted independence to the Phillipines sometime after the war, something the Japanese probably would not have done Masterblooregard (talk) 06:40, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

Just a reminder that this page exists to discuss how to improve our article, not to discuss the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Please take off-topic discussions elsewhere. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 08:32, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

True enough. But views like that hinted at here are surrent and will affect the editing of this article. Fo rhtose wol are tempted to read current controversies into past events (such as the background causation of Pearl Harbor) should be aware that such projection is very tricky, very often misleading and must be done with care. In this particular case, it is helpful to observe that WMD were held by all sides in and before WWII. That there were active research programs (the best known results are perhaps the nerve gases discovered by, for instance the Germans and the germ warfare research carried out (and tested on the Chinese population and on prisoner populations) by the Japanese under General Isshi near Harbin in China for a decade plus).

There was an active German atomic bomb research program (perhaps sabotaged by Heisenberg, or perhaps not) well known to Allied Intelligence (Moe Berg was commissioned US Intelligence to kill Heisenberg in Switzerland if necessary) and a less well known (even now) active Japanese research program as well. Not of course to leave out the Russian program, which was well supported by espionage (see Richard Rhodes books for the background). So any impulse to detect unique malevolence on the part of the Allies (specifically including the US) is either ill-informed, evidence of misunderstanding, or a commitment ot an ideological faith having little reference to the facts. This article should not be distorted by unsupportable speculation, these or any others. ww (talk) 07:39, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

I tagged "29 were lost during the battle". That was the total number; does that include birds pushed over the side as beyond repair, wrecked on recovery, &c? Trekphiler (talk) 21:15, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

Nagumo and Fuchida have just had their photos trimmed from the article. I liked having them in there... Any other editors think these two commanders' photos should be in the article? Is it a broadband vs. dial-up thing? Binksternet (talk) 04:25, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Concur. One editor's viewpoint, committed to minimal article sizes regardless of other criteria, is not a very good standard to follow. This is large topic and it is impossible on the face of it that an adequate article not be large. Recent excisions have done damage in my view as the article is much more a list of pointers to other places than a proper encyclopedic article of first resort as it should be.

Just how criteria or brevity and concision should precisely apply are of course subject to debate, but only in the context of moderation in the enforcement of one standard to the exculsion of others. Balance and moderation are good things too. And have been largely lost in the last flurry of edits. Perspective, please, people! ww (talk) 06:24, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Having now looked at the images situation, I find there are several all om a bunch. Looks exceptionally crude, not up to WP standards. The images should be distributed throughout the article, near the text which they illustrate. Anyone want to have a go at putting them in palce?

My, how this article has fallen since the days it was a featured article! Quite a degeneration. ww (talk) 06:52, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Hear hear! Jmlk17 06:54, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Far too much vandalism as of late... particularly from IPs. I have semi-protected the page for the time being. Hopefully this will help keep the level down. :) Jmlk17 23:47, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Don't hold your breath. Binksternet (talk) 20:49, 9 December 2007 (UTC)

I changed "counterbalance" to "deter" because that was FDR's aim; "counterbalance" seems to suggest a willingness to fight (FDR hoped to prevent a war, not start one, despite what the conspiracy loonies think), & "prevent" (given war in China) strikes me as "a bit damn late". I also changed to "a pre-emptive strike appeared to be the only way <ref>Peattie & Evans, '''Kaigun'''</ref> Japan could avoid U.S. interference in the Pacific", adding "<ref>An invasion of the Philippines was taken as given by Japanese planners, and U.S. reconquest was a given of [[War Plan Orange]] as far back as 1897.</ref> (whence also my change to the "contingency planning" ref). And I changed back to "shocked", because it was a profound shock to an American public hoping to move Japan without war (polling suggested about 70% support even for the oil embargo, but only about 6% if it meant war); unless you can show it was not a shock, don't change it. As for "agenda laden", I don't see it. Trekphiler (talk) 03:23, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

I'm baaack... I restored "(mistakenly) certain" because IJN COs were convinced U.S. & UK were inseparable; despite FDR's promises to Spenser-Churchill, he couldn't with certainty get Congress to agree to attack Japan, contrary to what IJN believed. (Hell, he couldn't get Congress to agree to attack Germany, & the Germans were shooting at USN destroyers.) In the note, I restored "reconquest had been a given" (it was a planning doc...) & del "several generations" (it already says "as far back as 1897"; I would presume {even tho I know...} it's been revised a few times...). On public opinion, I'd really doubt it supported war (or was aware it was coming), noted above, but (if we accept it wasn't a shock) I changed it to "pushed", which has the immediacy without being quite so loaded. (Judging by the reaction at recruiters when the news broke, I'd still say "shocked" is accurate.) 04:47, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

I can live with most of this. However, the Japanese belief that US * UK were wedded needs citation if we are to make so strong a claim. As for the public opinion business, that summer polls suggested it was well more than a majority in favor of war, from well under a majority the previous year. The impression that, without Pearl, Roosevelt would never have gotten the US in the War is an error based on an assumption of continuation in support for America First and such. ww (talk) 08:46, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

The Japanese belief US * UK were wedded is in Kaigun, which is footnoted close to the claim; I don't have it in front of me, so I can't cite the page, but I'll see if I can find it (if the local has a copy...). On public opinion, what I've seen doesn't support willingness for war, but I won't argue it (I may not have seen it); the issue was, could FDR move Congress to aid Britain in defending colonies in Asia (not to mention FDR was anticolonialist), & I doubt that. Also, was it a shock to the U.S. public? I'd say so. Would an attack only on the Philippines have moved the U.S. to war? I doubt it, & that difference is crucial. Trekphiler (talk) 18:59, 23 November 2007 (UTC)

On the question of attack on the Philippines not causing the US to go to War, you may be right, but it's speculation and so we can't include it here. ww (talk) 05:46, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

I'm not suggesting it, just that the Japanese were sure: there was a firm connection between the US & UK, when, in fact, there may not have been; they needed to conquer the Philippines; the need to conquer the Philippines would necessarily bring the U.S. in (per WPO); & so, they needed to attack Pearl. QED. Trekphiler (talk) 10:26, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

Do you mean ...would not necessarily bring the U.S. in...? In your previous post the idea of the Philippines being attacked would not have drawn the US into war seemed to be what you were saying. I'm actually pretty sure it would have, bombing American ships and bases in the Philippines would have been the same as Hawaii (since at the time it wasn't a state). The act of sinking our ships in port and killing so many sailors/soldiers in a surprise attack is what really got people riled up. Anynobody 23:15, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

Don't bet on it. The U.S. was already trying to divest herself of her Philippine responsibilities (one might say "entanglement"); the islands would have become independent shortly, but for the war. (To clarify, the Japanese were certain, as commonly belief has been since the war, an attack on the Philippines =attack U.S. =need KO PacFlt.) And Hawaii was far more strongly felt "U.S. territory" than the Philippines.

Also, let me add, it might be speculation, but if we can break out some of this into separate pages, an "effects" page should contain the possible outcomes of not attacking the Philippines/Pearl, as issues of legitimate historical study. Trekphiler (talk) 08:41, 26 November 2007 (UTC)

Bizarrely, the Result in the info box is wrong. It currently says "Decisive Japanese Victory". Well it might have been a Japanese victory, but it certainly wasn't a decisive one: it did not result in a decision, the war continued. What should we have instead? (I know we're supposed to be bold, but I'm not quite bold enough to change such an important part of an article I've just happened across by accident without at least a brief discussion.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.104.246.81 (talk) 22:27, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

As the article itself clearly indicates, in the "Aftermath" section, the attack, although a clear tactical success, was strategically a failure. The attack was certain to lead to direct war with Japan, so to suceed it would have had to so cripple the U.S. that it would be prevented from effectively waging war for a significant amount of time, sufficient to give Japan breathing room to expand and fortify its defensive perimeter. This the attack did not do, because of (1) the failure to sink the U.S. carriers (which were not present in the Harbor), (2) the failure to destroy the tank farms and their precious oil, and (3) the fact that because of the shallowness of the Harbor, some of the attacked ships were able to be refloated and returned to service. Thus the attack was a tactical success but a strategic failure. Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk/cont) 04:59, 9 December 2007 (UTC)

Please note that these two postings have been here for 2 1/2 months and a week, respectively, and that no one has answered them or engaged in a discussion on this topic. And yet, despite this, we keep getting edit summaries and other messages (in all caps, no less) demanding a discussion and threatening imposition of the three-revert rule (!!). Well, here it is, and here it has been -- so discuss, make your argument that the attack on Pearl Harbor was "decisive". Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk/cont) 03:36, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

It occurs to me that the problem here stems from a confusion between two meanings of "decisive". The first is "having the power to decide, conclusive", and the second is "beyond doubt, unmistakeable". The attack was not a decisive tactical victory in the first sense, but was decisive in the second sense -- this is why I offered "clear" as an alternative, since it is not ambiguous. If that can't be agreed on, then it's best to go without any adjective. Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk/cont) 03:43, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

"Clear" may be less ambiguous from some POVs, but from mine, it's a bit weak. "Decisive" is the traditional usage; maybe use it with a note in the text (or fn) to explain the diff? Trekphiler (talk) 12:35, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

You're correct, "clear" is somewhat less powerful than "decisive", but it has the advantage of not being able to be misconstrued. If there's another adjective that would convey the same sense, I'd probably go for it, but in the meantime, I've reverted to the version without an adjective. "Japanese tactical victory...." is unambiguous, descriptive and undeniably in line with the facts, so it probably doesn't require a modifier at all. Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk/cont) 02:12, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

I don't support 'Ed Fitzgeralds POV statement. This is decsive and not but decisive victory. I support people who says this is decisive. This is not just decisive, if anything this should be "Decisive absolute, total Japanese victory." Ed stop your POV and weak logic. and POV. 168.253.15.167 (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 01:53, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

Please sign your comments.

I'm afraid you have it completely backwards. "Decisive" is ambiguous, but in one sense of the word it makes a POV statement, whereas no adjective is less so, so I have reverted to the no adjective version (even though I believe "clear" is certainly justifiable).

You should also bone up a little on what "consensus" means -- a single anonymous editor in disagreement does not make a consensus, and also the way the three-revert rule works, as by the evidence of the messages you've been posting on my talk page, you apparently misunderstand it.

BTW, are you familiar with the expression "to win the battle but lose the war?" If not, you might look into it. Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk/cont) 02:08, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

Support Ed Fitzgerald. No qualifier needed, really, & avoids argument over what is/isn't decisive. Might put that in the article: is it considered decisive? Why/why not? Was it a bad idea? Cf comments on breaking that out in a "results" or "effects" page. Trekphiler (talk) 14:51, 18 December 2007 (UTC)

On December 6, President Roosevelt read an intercepted Japanese message and told his assistant Harry Hopkins, "This means war."[11] He never warned Admiral Husband Kimmel or Lt. Gen. Walter Short after reception of the message before the December 7 Pearl Harbor attack.

Roosevelt was not responsible for informing either of them, that was the job of the military high command, General Marshall (Army) and Admiral Stark (Navy). It would have been a serious breach of procedure for Roosevelt to directly talk to the field commanders over the heads of his high command. Roosevelt tried to contact Stark but couldn't reach him, as the Admiral was in a theatre and decided it was not important enough to have him called out, as both Marshall and Stark were also among the receipients of the intercept and supposed to have made all necessary preparations for a war in the pacific since the end of november. Nevfennas (talk) 23:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

FDR had the responsibility to instruct Stark & Marshall to warn, if he felt it was warranted. (He obviously didn't.) And both Stark & Marshall had already warned once (27 Nov) & Stark (at least) didn't feel a need to repeat. Beyond that, as written, it implies FDR knew the attack was coming at Pearl, & that is 20/20 hindsight (& the sort of nonsense the conspiracy nuts get into). Trekphiler (talk) 01:09, 9 December 2007 (UTC)

With this discussion in mind, I removed it. Trekphiler (talk) 05:25, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

User Trekphiler is, I believe, correct here, but not for the reasons he gives. FDR had interfered (for political reasons) in military deployment and had removed Kimmel's predecessor for objecting. Forward basing at Pearl wasn't the pressure point on the Japanese FDR seems to have imagined it would be.

But this claim, like many speculations does not distinguish between political reality (or FDR's take on it) and high quality military operational intelligence. That FDR saw a political consequence in some news report and expected war to come about as a result. This incident, if properly reported, does not mean (necessarily) what the first poster in this section suggests. And it is a logical fallacy to claim that it does. A kind of intellectual slight of hand as it were. ww (talk) 23:06, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

Forward basing might have been even more provocative than FDR, or anybody in US, recognized, rather than the deterrent intended. I'd disagree only in calling it "intellectual slight of hand"; rather, it's a hazard of hindsight: we see how it turned out, & read the events as if contemporary actors did, too, & it's for that reason the quote should be removed; it implies knowledge FDR could not have possessed. The entire conspiracy theory rests on just the fallacy ww (& the dixie dancekings?) suggests: post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Trekphiler (talk) 14:21, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

An external link which would be worth considering adding to the list; http://www.pearlharbor-history.org/ which includes accounts from both the American and Japanese perspectives. Another site of much broader interest, but with lots of information on Pearl Harbor is; http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm. This is an excellent Wikipedia page.Minorhistorian (talk) 11:34, 14 December 2007 (UTC)

The attack on Pearl Harbour was the pivotal military action of the Second World War. Everything else turns on this attack and it is also the weakest point in the plot of the story of World War Two. Without it lend lease to the Soviets might not have happened and the British could have found themselves very isolated. The Axis might have successfully contained the USSR and dismantled the British Empire.

Pearl Harbour didn't need to happen. The Japanese only wanted the oil in the Dutch East Indies which had been denied them through peaceful negotiation. All they had to do was take Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, colonies of nations that were at the time almost finished. Roosevelt was desperate to get into the war - but his focus was Hitler. He was only fortunate Hitler lived up to his undertakings to the Japanese to declare war on the US. If Hitler hadn't Roosevelt would have been denied his entry.

What led the Japanese to think that military action against Britain, and the Netherlands necessitated war with America? Certainly Mobil's ownership of the refineries on Java was an unavoidable entanglement but the Japanese had already clashed with US interests and forces in China with impunity. Yamamoto didn't want war with America. He knew he was awakening a giant. Why was he so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack?

Was it all Japanese mistakes or were they also 'encouraged' to think this way? A Japanese perspective would be very helpful.

Allmedia (talk) 01:06, 25 December 2007 (UTC)

I'm not so sure if you can define the attack as the "pivotal" action of the war. There were numerous pivotal moments and actions of the war. Jmlk17 09:38, 25 December 2007 (UTC)

Allmedia, Your comment reflects a view of the Raid, and Japanese behavior before it, which doesn't fit with a long line of Japanese behavior. Internally, leading politicians were assassinated as early as the early 20's (and at other times), an invasion of China was begun in 1931 (albeit presented as a 'liberation of Manchuria'), and japan -- as directed by the militarist factions -- was committed enough to it to quit the League of Nations. Japanese behavior throughout the period reflected a serious sense of racial/cultural superiority and destiny,and it lasted for decades (and hasn't died out yet in some circles).

So the claim that Japan was "only" looking for resources denied them by nasty Westerners doesn't really fit the history. Those nasty Westerners were providing the resource basis for Japan's actions -- albeit with increasingly serious protestations -- from the end of WWI to the middle of 1941. And despite such blatant incidents as the attack on the USS Panay on the Yangtze -- known to the US to have been deliberate and not an accident (more crypto stuff there). The argument that Japan was 'forced' into war is a popular one, even today, amongst Japanese apologists, but just doesn't fit with Imperial behavior for at least 20 years (and more) prior to 7.12.41. And this was across governments headed by hawks, doves, and hummingbirds (in a Japanese context). The lesson may be that those committed, to the exclusion of all other perspectives, to a sense of grievance or superiority or some such are dangerous. True in Hitler's Germany, much of Soviet history (till bureaucratic ossification), etc.

There was some material on Japanese perspectives on the Raid in a previous version of this article, In fact, in the version which earned it Featured status. Slashing revisions in the last few months have removed nearly all of that content in the name of brevity. Not a good tradeoff in my view. ww (talk) 18:08, 25 December 2007 (UTC)

"Everything else turns on this attack and it is also the weakest point in the plot of the story of World War Two. Without it lend lease to the Soviets might not have happened and the British could have found themselves very isolated. " Half right. There would have been no Lend-Lease to the SU, a non-ally, but Britain would have been better off. Recall, every tank & airplane that went to the AFUS would instead have gone to Britain; just a couple of squadrons of VLR B-24s at Gander (instead of PTO, where many went) would have put the U-boat threat to rest much sooner.

"The Axis might have successfully contained the USSR and dismantled the British Empire." Not a chance. The Soviets would eventually have destroyed the German Army anyhow, given Hitler's incompetent leadership; Soviet production, except of trucks & such, was out of German reach. There might have been some "lend-lease" from Britain out of "surplus" equipment (not unlike in fact), but in the essentials (T-34s, fighters, rifles), the Soviets were at no risk of running out. The open question is, what would have happened when the Germans were beaten, with no U.S. to balance Soviet ambition in Western Europe.

"What led the Japanese to think that military action against Britain, and the Netherlands necessitated war with America?" Excellent question. The Philippines is one answer; it was a clear threat (in Japanese eyes) to their lines of communication to the Dutch East Indies, & conquest of them was a given in Japanese plans. Peattie & Evans offer U.S. support for Britain against Hitler as evidence for ineffable solidarity; I suspect it was more (but that's OR...).

"Why was [Yamamoto] so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack?" That is the US$64000 question.... My suspicion is, he was not, but IJA leaders were, & he went along, lacking the courage to resist; I suggest he should have threatened not resignation but hara kiri, & carried it out, if he was ignored: it was the one thing all Japanese would understand, & if someone so senior was so convinced IJA was wrong... Doesn't his page say anything to it? Trekphiler (talk) 11:09, 29 December 2007 (UTC)